A cost-effective measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
  system for quantum networks by Valivarthi, Raju et al.
1A cost-effective measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution system for quantum
networks
Raju Valivarthi, Qiang Zhou, Caleb John, Francesco Marsili, Varun B. Verma, Matthew D. Shaw, Sae Woo Nam,
Daniel Oblak, and Wolfgang Tittel
Abstract—We experimentally realize a measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) system based
on cost-effective and commercially available hardware such as
distributed feedback (DFB) lasers and field-programmable gate
arrays (FPGA) that enable time-bin qubit preparation and time-
tagging, and active feedback systems that allow for compensation
of time-varying properties of photons after transmission through
deployed fibre. We examine the performance of our system,
and conclude that its design does not compromise performance.
Our demonstration paves the way for MDI-QKD-based quantum
networks in star-type topology that extend over more than 100
km distance.
Index Terms—Quantum communication, quantum cryptogra-
phy, quantum detectors, fiber optics communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
BEING the most mature quantum information technol-ogy, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows establishing
cryptographic keys between two distant users (commonly
known as Alice and Bob) based on the laws of quantum
mechanics [1]–[4]. In conjunction with one-time-pad (OTP)
encoding, QKD thereby provides a way for provably secure
communication, thus promising to end the ongoing battle
between codemakers and codebreakers. Many QKD systems,
including commercial systems, have been developed during
the last 30 years [2]–[5], and figures-of-merit such as secret
key rates and maximum transmission distance continue to
improve. However, quantum hacking over the past decade
has also established that the specifications of components and
devices used in actual QKD systems never perfectly agree with
the theoretical description used in security proofs, which can
compromise the security of real QKD systems. For instance,
the so-called ‘blinding attacks’ exploit vulnerabilities of single
photon detectors (SPDs) to open a side-channel via which an
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eavesdropper can gain full information about the (assumed-
to-be) secure key [6]. Making practical QKD systems secure
against all such attacks is a challenging task that has been
investigated by many research groups. One approach is to de-
velop attack-specific counter-measures [7]–[9]. Unfortunately,
the success of this strategy strongly depends on how well a
QKD system is characterized, and the security of a ‘patched’
QKD system may be compromised in future due to new
and unforeseen attacks. A better solution is to devise and
implement protocols that are intrinsically free of all side-
channel attacks such as device-independent QKD (DI-QKD)
[10], whose security is guaranteed by a loophole-free Bell test.
Although such tests have recently been reported [11]–[13], the
implementation of long distance DI-QKD still seems unlikely
in the near future.
Several groups, rather than eliminating the vulnerability
to all side-channel attacks, have recently started to focus
on QKD protocols that are immune to the most dangerous
side-channel attacks, i.e. all possible (known or yet-to-be
proposed) detector side-channel attacks. One of these pro-
tocols is inspired by time-reversed entanglement-based QKD
[14], [15] and is known as measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) [16]. It requires a Bell state measurement
(BSM) at a central station, usually referred-to as Charlie, to
create entanglement-like correlations between Alice and Bob.
The key feature is that even if an eavesdropper completely
controls the measurement devices (e.g. by replacing the BSM
by another measurement), she would not be able to gain
any information about the distributed key without Alice and
Bob noticing. This means no assumptions are required about
the measurement devices to guarantee the security of MDI-
QKD, thus making it intrinsically immune to all detector side-
channel attacks. Furthermore, due to the possibility for a large
number of users to connect to the same Charlie, point-to-
point MDI-QKD is ideally suited for extension into star-type
networks. And last but not least, MDI-QKD can be seamlessly
upgraded – not disruptively replaced – into quantum repeater-
based long-distance quantum communication as more mature
hardware becomes available [18], [19].
Due to the above-mentioned advantages, MDI-QKD has
received much attention over the past 5 years and has mean-
while been demonstrated by several experimental groups in
different configurations. Initial experiments consisted of proof-
of-principle demonstrations in a real-world environment with
time-bin qubits [20] and in the laboratory using the same
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2encoding but with random selection of bases and states
(as is required for secure key generation) [21]. Subsequent
demonstrations have included MDI-QKD in the laboratory
with polarization qubits [22], [23]. Furthermore, long distance
MDI-QKD has been achieved over 200 km and 404 km of
spooled optical fiber [24], [25], and been mimicked using a
short fibre with additional 60 dB loss [26]. More recently,
additional point-to-point and network field tests have been
implemented [27], [28].
In our previous studies, we have demonstrated a proof-of-
principle of MDI-QKD over deployed fibre [20], and also
assessed the impact of using different single-photon detectors
and different methods for time-bin qubit preparation on the
performance of MDI-QKD [26]. The comprehensive under-
standing of trade-offs among complexity, cost, and system
performance acquired through these investigations has now
allowed us to develop a complete system, which is described
and characterized in the following sections. In particular,
our MDI-QKD system now also includes time tagging of
qubit generations and detections, which allows key gener-
ation from qubits in randomly prepared states, and further
improved polarization and arrival-time control of photons
travelling from Alice and Bob to Charlie, which ensures
their indistinguishability at the moment of the BSM. After
examining the overall system performance (i.e. secret key
rates and maximally-tolerable transmission loss), we conclude
that our cost-effective implementation does not compromise
the performance of MDI-QKD. We note that our real-time
and continuously-running photon-state control can also be
employed in other real-world systems that require stabilization
of channels for quantum information transfer, e.g. in quantum
teleportation [29].
II. PROTOCOL
In the MDI-QKD protocol, the two users – Alice and Bob
– prepare qubits randomly in one of the four BB84 states. In
the case of time-bin qubits, these are |e〉, |l〉, |+〉 ≡ (|e〉 +
|l〉)/√2, and |−〉 ≡ (|e〉 − |l〉)/√2. Here, |e〉 and |l〉 denote
the emission of a photon in an early and late temporal mode,
respectively, forming the so-called Z-basis, while |+〉 and |−〉
describe superpositions of photon emissions and form the X-
basis. Alice and Bob agree that |+〉 and |e〉 correspond to a
classical bit value of ‘0’, and |−〉 and |l〉 to ‘1’. The prepared
qubits are sent to a third party, generally referred-to as Charlie.
Charlie performs a BSM that projects the joint state of the two
qubits (one from Alice and one from Bob) onto one of the four
maximally entangled Bell states,
|ψ±AB〉 =
1√
2
(|eAlB〉 ± |lAeB〉),
|φ±AB〉 =
1√
2
(|eAeB〉 ± |lAlB〉). (1)
Once a sufficiently large number of qubits has been trans-
mitted to Charlie [32], he publicly announces which of
his joint measurements resulted in one of these four states
(photons often get lost during transmission, making a BSM
impossible), and he also identifies the measurement result.
This allows Alice and Bob to discard the records of qubits
that did not generate a successful BSM. It is worth noting
that to ensure security, Charlie only needs to be able to
project onto one Bell state, but access to more Bell states
will increase the key rate in MDI-QKD [33]. Next, based
on the information from Charlie, Alice and Bob perform a
basis reconciliation procedure known as key sifting. For every
successful projection onto a Bell state at Charlie’s, Alice and
Bob use an authenticated public channel to reveal and compare
the preparation bases for their respective qubits, X or Z, and
keep only the record of events for which they have picked
same basis. Depending on the result of the BSM and the users’
preparation bases, Bob must post-process his bit values so that
they become identical to Alice’s. For instance, Bob performs
a bit flip if the announced measurement resulted in |ψ−AB〉,
which indicates anti-correlated bits in both the X- and Z-basis.
Furthermore, due to imperfect qubit preparation, channel
noise and noisy single-photon detectors, as well as possible
eavesdropping, it is necessary to go through a key distillation
process: (1) Alice and Bob publicly reveal a subset of their
(non-discarded) bit values, and estimate the error rate for each
basis independently; (2) they perform classical error correction
on the bits resulting from Z-basis preparation; (3) the error
rate for the X-basis is used to bound the information that an
eavesdropper could have obtained during photon transmission
and detection – it is subsequently removed by means of privacy
amplification. This results in a secure key, whose key rate is
given by:
S ≥ [QZ [1− h2(eX)]−QXfh2(eX)]. (2)
Here, QZ(X) refers to the gain, i.e. the probability of a
projection onto a Bell state per emitted pair of qubits in either
basis; eZ(X) denotes error rates, i.e. the ratio of erroneous to
total projections onto a Bell state per emitted pair of qubits
prepared either basis; h2 is the binary Shannon entropy and
f ≥ 1 characterizes the efficiency of error correction with
respect to Shannon’s noisy coding theorem.
The above-described protocol, which was originally pro-
posed in 1996 [31], needs qubits encoded into genuine single
photons. This is currently difficult to realize due to the lack of
high-quality single photon sources. Fortunately, it is possible
to overcome this problem by using phase-randomized attenu-
ated laser pulses, which are easy to prepare using commercial
technology, in conjunction with the so-called decoy state
technique [16], [32], [34], [35]. By randomly modulating the
mean photon number of the laser pulses between several values
known as ‘vacuum’, ‘decoy’ and ‘signal’ [39], [40], one can
assess lower and upper bounds on the gain and the error rate
associated with Alice’s and Bob’s laser pulses both containing
exactly one photon, respectively. In this case, the secret key
rate is given by
S ≥ [QZ11[1− h2(eX11)]−QZµσfh2(eZµσ)]. (3)
The subscript ‘11’ denotes values for gain and error rate
stemming from Alice and Bob both emitting a single photon,
and ‘µσ’ denotes values associated with mean photon numbers
per emitted pair of ‘signal’ pulses of µ and σ, respectively. As
in Eq. (2), the basis is indicated by the superscript.
3III. IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR MDI-QKD
In this section, we describe the realization of our MDI-QKD
system (a schematics is given in. Figure 1). We divide our
system into four parts: qubit preparation modules, BSM mod-
ule, control modules (ensuring indistinguishability of photons
arriving at Charlie), and time-tagging module. In the following
subsections we describe the implementation of each module.
A. Qubit preparation modules
As mentioned in section II, Alice and Bob need to prepare
qubits randomly in one of the four BB84 states. Furthermore,
to use attenuated laser pulses as opposed to true single photons
as carriers, they also have to vary the pulses’ mean photon
number and randomize the qubits’ global phase. We employ,
for both Alice and Bob, a distributed feedback (DFB) laser
at 1548 nm wavelength combined with a home-built driver
board. By operating the laser below and above the lasing
threshold (i.e. operating it in gain-switching mode), we first
generate phase-randomized laser pulses of 40 ns duration,
which eliminates the possibility of an unambiguous-state-
discrimination attack [41], [42]. The pulses are then sent into
an intensity modulator (IM) where, depending on the desired
qubit state, early and/or late temporal modes of 200 ps duration
and with 2.5 ns separation are carved out. The electrical
pulses applied to the IM are created by an FPGA-based signal
generator (SG). We feed the resulting optical signals into a
phase modulator (PM) that can apply a phase shift of pi to the
late mode, as determined by a random binary electronic signal
created by the same SG. A second IM then allows to rapidly
vary the overall intensity of these pulses, and a 99:1 beam-
splitter combined with a photo-diode (not shown in Fig. 1)
is used in a feedback loop to maximize and maintain the
extinction ratio of both IMs combined at about 60 dB. Finally,
an optical attenuator allows reducing the intensity of all light
pulses to the single photon level, and an optical isolator (ISO)
with 50 dB isolation is used to shield Alice and Bob from
Trojan horse attacks [43]. The current qubit generation rate is
20 MHz. In our implementation, all electronic signals from
the SG board are determined by binary random numbers that
have been created off-line using a quantum random number
generator (QRNG) [44], and are stored in the FPGA.
B. Stabilization and feedback modules
For Charlie to be able to perform a BSM successfully, the
photons emitted by Alice and Bob need to be indistinguishable
in all degrees of freedom, i.e spatial, spectral, polarization and
temporal degrees. The spatial overlap is trivially guaranteed by
the use of single mode fibers. The spectral overlap is ensured
by carefully tuning and stabilizing the wavelengths of the DFB
lasers used for creating qubits. On the other hand, since the
photons generally travel long distances (tens of kilometres)
through independent fibers, they are subjected to different
time-varying environments. This results in fluctuating polariza-
tion states and arrival times at Charlie’s. It is thus necessary
to employ feedback mechanisms to actively compensate for
these changes. For efficient key generation, it is desirable
for the feedback systems not to interfere with the actual key
distribution (ensuring maximum running time for key distri-
bution), and for all the expensive components of the control
module to be included into Charlie. This will allow several
users in a future star-type network to share these resources,
thereby adding to the cost-effectiveness of the network. As
described in detail below, the feedback mechanisms used in
our implementation satisfy these requirements.
1) Spectral degree of freedom: To ensure spectral overlap,
we employ two continuous-wave DFB lasers with similar
bandwidth. We tune their frequency with a resolution of 11.25
MHz by changing the temperatures of the laser diodes until the
difference becomes small compared to the spectral width of the
created (200 ps long) light pulses, which is 1.26 GHz assuming
Gaussian shapes. Towards this end, we interfere unmodulated
light emitted by the two lasers into extra fibers on a 50:50
beamsplitter and detect the beat signal (not shown in Fig. 1).
Using a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) feedback loop
that acts on the laser temperature, the frequency difference
remains below 20 MHz during a period of more than 40 hours.
While it is possible to continuously monitor the frequency
difference without affecting qubit generation, this was only
necessary in the beginning of, but not during, a measurement.
2) Polarization degree of freedom: To ensure that the pho-
tons coming from Alice and Bob have the same polarization
at Charlie, we insert polarization beam splitters (PBSs) at
the two inputs of the polarization maintaining beam splitter
(PMBS) where the BSM takes place. Polarization fluctuations
will thus be mapped onto fluctuations in the count rates of
the two superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
(SNSPDs) [45] that are used to perform the BSM. These
fluctuations control the settings of two polarization controllers
(PC, General Photonics, Polastay-POS-002-E) that actively
change polarization of input light until the single detector
count rates are maximized and hence all polarization changes
during photon transmission are compensated for. We empha-
size that our method for polarization control does not require
extra single photon detectors (SPDs) at Charlie, which differs
from the method used in [24]. Moreover our approach results
in continuously running polarization feedback, unlike other
methods that necessitate interrupting the stream of quantum
signals [20], [26].
3) Timing: To compensate for varying transmission times
from Alice and Bob, respectively, to Charlie, we observe the
degree of Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) quantum interference at
Charlie [29]. To this end, the signals from his two SNSPDs are
sent to a HOM unit (in addition to signalling projections onto
Bell states, which is further described below), which monitors
the rate of coincidence detections corresponding to either both
photons arriving in mode |e〉, or both in mode |l〉. Thanks
to the photon bunching, the coincidence count rate reaches a
minimum when the photons from Alice and Bob arrive at the
PMBS at exactly the same time, providing a precise feedback
signal using which we keep arrival times locked. More pre-
cisely, we vary Alice’s qubit generation time with a precision
of 27.8 ps (∼7.2 times less than the width of each temporal
mode) to keep the coincidence count rate continuously at the
minimum. Thus the arrival times are matched using a free-
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Fig. 1. Experimental setup. PC: polarization controller, PBS: polarization beam splitter, PMBS: polarization maintaining beam splitter, SNSPD: superconducting
nanowire single photon detector, HOM: Hong-Ou-Mandel measurement, CLK: clock, BSM: Bell state measurement, DWDM: dense wavelength division
multiplexers, PD: photo-detector, FPGA: field-programmable gate array, IM: intensity modulator, PM: phase modulator, ATT: attenuator, ISO: isolator, QC:
quantum channel, CC: classical channel. Note that the CLK and BSM signals are distributed to Alice and Bob electronically in the experiment.
running feedback mechanism, which does not require the use
of additional SNSPDs or high bandwidth PDs [30].
C. BSM module
The BSM module for time-bin qubit-based MDI-QKD
includes a PMBS followed by two SNSPDs, and a fast
logical circuit triggered by the electrical signals from the
two SNSPDs. For the two-photon projection measurement,
the two indistinguishable photons – one from Alice and one
from Bob – are overlapped at the PMBS to erase which-
way information. A projection onto the |ψ−AB〉 Bell state is
signalled by coincidence detection of two photons (one in each
SNSPD) in orthogonal temporal modes (one in |e〉 and one
in |l〉, while |ψ+AB〉 corresponds to coincidence detection of
two photons in orthogonal temporal modes but in the same
detector. It is worth noting that the BSM efficiency is limited
to 50% when only linear optics and no auxiliary photons are
used [46]. In our implementation, we only select projections
onto |ψ−AB〉 for secret key generation, which reduces the
maximum efficiency (assuming lossless detection) to 25%.
The coincidence measurement is realized using a home-built
broadband logical circuit with a coincidence window of ∼0.7
ns.
D. Time-tagging module
For any MDI-QKD system, a time-tagging module is needed
to record the information of Alice’s and Bob’s qubit prepa-
rations. In our case, this concerns the emission time with a
precision of 50 ns plus four bits that specify the basis (X or Z),
the bit value (0 or 1), and which out of three different mean
photon numbers (vacuum, decoy, signal) have been chosen.
Furthermore, the time of a successful BSM at Charlie plus
the state projected onto (in our case only |ψ−〉) must be
registered. Knowing the exact travel times from Alice and
Bob, respectively, to Charlie then allows back-tracking and
establishing which two qubits have interacted at Charlie. Here
we chose a simpler and less memory-intensive approach.
In our MDI-QKD system, Charlie sends a common clock
signal to synchronize the qubit preparation devices at Alice
and Bob. During the time tagging process, Alice and Bob send
the information of their prepared qubits (with the exception of
time) into memory buffers, i.e. first-in-first-out (FIFO) buffers
in their FPGAs, while the corresponding qubits are sent to
Charlie. The memory buffer time is set to be equal to the time
required by the qubits to reach Charlie plus the time required
by the BSM signals to reach Alice (Bob) from Charlie. A
simple logic operation then allows singling out only qubit
generations that resulted in a successful BSM – only those
are further processed. Note that our time-tagging module is
integrated in the same FPGA that is also used as a SG (see
section III-A).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first test the indistinguishability between the photons
from Alice and Bob by measuring the visibility of HOM
interference using two spooled fibres of 40 km length. Figure 2
shows the result; the mean photon number is 0.03 per qubit.
The circles are the experimentally measured values, while the
dashed line is a fit assuming 200 ps wide Gaussian pulses.
A visibility of 46.4±0.5% is obtained in our measurement,
which is slightly smaller than the maximally possible value of
50% for pulses with Poissonian photon-number distribution.
The difference is due to residual distinguishability of the two
photons, such as residual difference of spectral and temporal
modes.
Next we run the full QKD system and assess its perfor-
mance. In the experiment, Alice and Bob prepare time-bin
qubits based on pre-stored random numbers and send them
to Charlie. Once Charlie successfully projects onto the |ψ−〉
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Fig. 2. Result of HOM interference between two independent qubits, encoded
into phase-randomized attenuated laser pulses, after each has traveled over
40 km of spooled fiber. Dots show the measured results; the dashed line is
the simulation with 200 ps long Gaussian pulses. The maximally achievable
visibillity is 50%.
Bell state, he sends a signal to Alice and Bob, who tag the
corresponding random numbers (i.e. qubit states) on their cor-
responding time-tagging modules. After accumulating about
30 million bytes of tagged data, Alice and Bob compare their
files. Based on the gains and quantum bit error rates (QBERs)
obtained from this comparison, we calculate the achievable se-
cure key rate [39]. Figure 3 shows the experimental results and
the theoretical prediction for the different setups used in our
demonstrations. The performance is tested with spooled fibre
of 2×40 km and 2×60 km (diamonds), and with attenuators
simulating lossy quantum channels (circles). We emphasize
that all feedback mechanisms are running continuously during
the measurements. We find that all measurement results agree
well with the prediction (the dashed curve). In particular, the
secret key rate over 80 km of spooled fiber is of about 0.1 kbps,
which can be improved to around 10 kbps by increasing the
clock rate from the current 20 MHz to 2 GHz – the maximum
allowed by the 200 ps time-jitter of the SNSPDs [33], [45].
Finally, we note that the performance of our implementation
predicts positive secure key rates over up to 400 km assuming
(standard) fiber with 0.2 dB loss/km. This distance can be
increase to 500 km when using ultra low-loss fibre (0.16 dB
loss/km) as in [25], [47].
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
We have demonstrated a MDI-QKD system based on cost-
effective hardware such as commercial DFB lasers; FPGA-
based preparation, time-tagging and timing control; and active
feedback control for frequency, polarization and arrival-time
of photons. Our demonstration paves the way for MDI-QKD-
based star-type quantum networks with kbps secret key rates
spanning geographical distances in excess of 100 km.
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